Emotional Mimicry in Social Context: The Case of Disgust and Pride by Agneta H. Fischer et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 02 November 2012
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00475
Emotional mimicry in social context: the case of disgust
and pride
Agneta H. Fischer*, Daniela Becker and LotteVeenstra
Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
Edited by:
Vera Shuman, University of Geneva,
Switzerland
Reviewed by:
Dennis Hofman, Utrecht University,
Netherlands
Shlomo Hareli, University of Haifa,
Israel
*Correspondence:
Agneta H. Fischer , Department of
Social Psychology, University of
Amsterdam, Weesperplein 4, 1018 XA
Amsterdam, Netherlands.
e-mail: a.h.fischer@uva.nl
A recent review on facial mimicry concludes that emotional mimicry is less ubiquitous than
has been suggested, and only occurs in interactions that are potentially affiliative (see Hess
and Fischer, in revision). We hypothesize that individuals do not mimic facial expressions
that can be perceived as offensive, such as disgust, and mimic positive emotion displays,
but only when the context is affiliative (i.e., with intimates). Second, we expect that in
spontaneous interactions not mimicry, but empathic feelings with the other predict the
accurateness of emotion recognition. Data were collected in a pseudo-experimental set-
ting, during an event organized for subscribers of a large Dutch women’s magazine. One
woman (expresser) was exposed to two emotional stimuli (i.e., a vile smell, a compliment)
in order to evoke disgust and pride respectively. Another woman (observer: intimate or
stranger) was sitting opposite of her. We collected self-report measures on emotions and
empathy, and coded facial expressions of disgust and smiling on the basis of FACS. The
results show that participants do not mimic disgust. In contrast, smiles displayed after the
vile smell and the compliment were mimicked, but only among intimates. We also found
that self-reported empathy and not mimicry is related to the recognition of disgust. These
findings are discussed in the light of a Social Contextual view on emotional mimicry.
Keywords: emotional mimicry, facial mimicry, disgust, pride, affiliation, social context
INTRODUCTION
How do we react to someone showing faces of fear, disgust, or
happiness? One answer to this question is that we mimic these
expressions and show similar faces of fear, disgust, and happi-
ness, respectively. The automatic mimicry of non-verbal emotion
expressions (Hatfield et al., 1994; Dimberg et al., 2000) is assumed
to have two important social functions, namely fostering social
bonds, and helping to understand and empathize with others’
emotions. However, a recent review of the literature Hess and
Fischer (in revision) has raised questions about the consensus that
the prevailing response to an emotional facial reaction is mimicry.
They argue that the definition of emotional mimicry is unclear
and that the evidence, in particular for the mimicry of negative
emotions, is rather limited.
This lack of consistent evidence can be explained from a Social
Contextual perspective (e.g., Keltner and Haidt, 1999; Fischer et al.,
2003; Parkinson et al., 2005; Fischer and Manstead, 2008; Van
Kleef, 2009; Parkinson, 2011; Hess and Fischer, in revision). A
Social Contextual view holds that mimicry serves a social func-
tion, and is dependent on the social context in which the emotion
is expressed. Emotional mimicry is the imitation of an emotional
intention rather than the movement of facial muscles and we only
mimic if the emotional signal and the relationship are perceived
as affiliative, and if we want to affiliate. Indeed, there are many sit-
uations in which mimicry of negative emotions and even positive
emotions could be non-affiliative, and thus rather dysfunctional
from a social point of view, for example when our partner is angry
at us, or when our friend shows fear for a small spider, or when
our enemy laughs at us.
Whereas social context effects on mimicry have been
investigated in previous research (e.g., McHugo et al., 1985, 1991;
Lanzetta and Englis, 1989; Hess et al., 1999; Yabar and Hess, 2007;
Likowski et al., 2008; Van der Schalk et al., 2011), evidence from
experimental contexts where the interaction partner is actually
present is scarce. However, we think this type of evidence is impor-
tant for studying social functions of mimicry, because in actual
interactions the social effects of emotional mimicry are expected
to have more impact than when one is watching a non-respondent
target on a photo or in a video. In the present study we test
hypotheses following from a Social Contextual view on emotional
mimicry. We evoke two emotions, disgust and pride, and exam-
ine whether observers mimic these emotions to the same extent
among intimates and strangers, and whether the recognition of
disgust and pride is determined by attempts to empathize and/or
by mimicking.
EVIDENCE FOR EMOTIONAL MIMICRY
Many studies have addressed facial mimicry (e.g., Dimberg, 1982;
Dimberg and Lundqvist, 1990; Lundqvist, 1995; Lundqvist and
Dimberg, 1995; Dimberg and Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg et al.,
2002), leading to a general consensus that there is abundant evi-
dence that we mimic each other’s emotions. However, Hess and
Fischer (in revision) concluded that the empirical evidence for the
existence of emotional mimicry is limited. First, in the majority of
studies only two emotions have been included, namely anger and
happiness, and the occurrence of mainly smiling and frowning
in reaction to these two displays have been regarded as indicative
of facial mimicry. Second, studies that have included more than
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two emotions have predominantly shown that we frown more
in reaction to angry, fearful, sad, or disgust faces than to neutral
faces (e.g., Lundqvist and Dimberg, 1995; Hess and Blairy, 2001;
Magnée et al., 2007; Bourgeois and Hess, 2008; Likowski et al.,
2008; Weyers et al., 2009).
However, frowning is a rather a-specific facial reaction, and
these findings therefore need not necessarily reflect mimicry. A
frown basically signals that something is wrong and thus needs
our attention (Kaiser and Wehrle, 2001), and may indicate vari-
ous negative emotions, as well as a negative mood, concentration,
concern, or effort. More conclusive evidence for the mimicry of
discrete emotions should show facial movements of similar mus-
cles as the one’s displayed, such as the Frontalis for surprise (lifting
the eyebrows), or the Levator Labii Alaeque Nasi for disgust (nose
wrinkling). Studies including these facial muscles have produced
inconsistent effects, however. In the case of disgust, for example,
mimicry effects measured with activity of the Levator were found
in only one of three studies (Lundqvist and Dimberg, 1995). Hess
and Fischer (in revision) therefore concluded that empirical data
on facial mimicry to date mainly justify the conclusion that we
react to emotional faces with facial displays that are similar in
valence, but not that we mimic discrete emotions, such as anger,
disgust, sadness, or fear. We may explain this lack of evidence when
considering the social functions of mimicry.
SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF EMOTIONAL MIMICRY
The occurrence and functions of emotional mimicry can be
explained from a Social Contextual perspective. Following other
social functional accounts of contagion and empathy (e.g., Hat-
field et al., 1994; Keltner and Haidt, 1999; Parkinson, 2005, 2011;
Fischer and Manstead, 2008; Hess and Fischer, in revision), we
argue that emotional mimicry serves an affiliation function and
thus should only occur when the emotional signal can be perceived
as affiliative and when mimicry would promote social bonds and
mutual understanding.
This implies first of all that mimicry depends on the relation-
ship between expresser and observer, because the interpretation
of an emotional signal also depends on how one relates to the
expresser. The importance of this relationship is indeed evi-
dent from behavioral mimicry studies (Cheng and Chartrand,
2003; Lakin and Chartrand, 2003; Lakin et al., 2003; Stel and
Vonk, 2010), but also from emotional mimicry studies. For exam-
ple, a more positive attitude toward the target (Likowski et al.,
2008), or a more cooperative social context (Lanzetta and Englis,
1989), or the target being an ingroup member have all shown
to elicit more mimicry (Hess et al., 1999; Yabar and Hess, 2007;
Van der Schalk et al., 2011). These results thus suggest that we
mimic the emotions of similar others, friends or intimates more
than the emotional displays of dissimilar others, strangers or
competitors.
Second, these and other studies also demonstrate that mim-
icry not only depends on the relational context, but also on the
nature of the emotional display, for example whether it signals
approach or rather attack, or distancing. In examining the spon-
taneous mimicry of smiles and frowns in different public settings,
for example, Hinsz and Tomhave (1991) found that many people
mimic strangers’ smiles, but they hardly mimic strangers’ frowns.
We therefore hypothesize that negative emotions that signal
attack or criticism, such as anger or disgust (Roseman et al., 1994)
will generally not be mimicked, because they do not intrinsically
signal empathy or understanding. Although previous research
has sometimes found congruent displays in reaction to anger or
disgust, we expect that in an actual interaction the presence of
an interaction partner is more salient, which may reduce or even
dissolve mimicry in reaction to an offensive display. This is nicely
illustrated in a study by Bourgeois and Hess (2008), who found
that participants do not mimic anger, but they do mimic the smiles
of a fellow student when narrating an anger experience. In addi-
tion, social effects may also be more salient if one actually knows
the other person well and may be amplified with the intimacy
of the relationship. Indeed, Häfner and IJzerman (2011) showed
that individuals high in communal strength mimic their partner’s
anger less than individual slow in communal strength.
Whereas these studies have focused on anger, the same may
apply to disgust, as recent research (Chapman et al., 2009) has
shown that disgust expressions can also be evoked in reaction to
offensive stimuli in the social domain. Therefore, disgust faces, like
anger faces can also be interpreted as directed at the observer, or at
least interpreted as unpleasant. A social context in which disgust
is expressed can thus often be considered non-affiliative.
The display of positive emotions, in contrast, is generally an
affiliative signal, reflecting rapport, understanding, or solidarity
(see e.g., Bourgeois and Hess, 2008). However, this is only the case
to the extent that the relationship is potentially affiliative (see also
Stel et al., 2010). Thus, whereas it is most likely that we mimic
the smiles of our friends and intimates, and would even mimic the
smiles of strangers in a neutral, potentially affiliative situation (e.g.,
as a signal of politeness or recognition or shared amusement), we
would not mimic a smile that could be interpreted as hostile, or
offensive, and thus as non-affiliative. This could occur, for exam-
ple, when strangers smile when they clearly feel Schadenfreude, or
inappropriate amusement in response to a racist joke. In the same
vein, the proud smile of a stranger would generally not be mim-
icked, as this expression may imply that the other thinks of him
or herself as better, thereby increasing social distance (Markus and
Kitayama, 1991). On the other hand, friends may share their pride,
because they share the recognition of each other’s achievement
(i.e., basking in reflected glory), rendering it more likely that pride
smiles would be mimicked (e.g., Fischer and Manstead, 2008). In
addition, smiles of friends who share an amusing, or even awkward
situation would also be mimicked more than smiles of strangers
in similar situations (see also Fridlund, 1991; Hess et al., 1995;
Jakobs et al., 1999, 2001). In other words, smiles that are perceived
to signal affiliation and shared feelings are generally more likely
to be spontaneously mimicked, which is the case when friends or
intimates smile to each other.
A second function that has been proposed for emotion mim-
icry is the facilitation of the recognition of others’ emotions
(Lipps, 1907). The basic assumption is that observers mimic
emotion expressions, which generates facial feedback, which in
turn helps the observer to recognize the other’s non-verbal dis-
play through emotional simulation (e.g., Niedenthal, 2007). The
relation between mimicry and emotion recognition has been
examined in various types of studies, but provided inconclusive
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evidence (see Parkinson, 2011; Hess and Fischer, in revision). In
one line of research the function of mimicry has been examined
by comparing two conditions in which participants’ mimicry is
either blocked or not (e.g., Blairy et al., 1999; Niedenthal et al.,
2000; Stel and van Knippenberg, 2008; Hawk et al., 2011; Maringer
et al., 2011). The blocking of specific facial muscles affected the
speed of recognition of emotions, either in a positive or negative
way, depending on the task and judgment context. Other studies,
however, did not find support for the role of mimicry in emotion
recognition. For example, Hess and Blairy (2001) measured partic-
ipants’ facial displays and self-reported emotions when decoding
short videos of natural facial expressions. They did not find evi-
dence for the idea that either self-reported emotions or emotion
mimicry predicted accuracy in emotion recognition. In line with
previous theorizing and research (e.g., Hatfield et al., 1994; Hess
and Blairy, 2001; Bogart and Matsumoto, 2010; Parkinson, 2011),
and because we think mimicry is less prevalent as often assumed,
we think that mimicry is not a necessary condition for correctly
interpreting another’s emotion.
In addition, various studies have shown that emotion expres-
sions may not only elicit mimicry, but also feelings of empathy
(e.g., Sonnby-Borgström, 2002; Sonnby-Borgström et al., 2003;
Lamm et al., 2008) or perspective taking (Hawk et al., 2011).
Hawk et al. (2011) for example, show that observing an embar-
rassed emotion display of a person dancing on a silly song, elicits
both mimicry and perspective taking, as measured by self-reports.
We may therefore suggest that an empathic stance could also
help to understand or correctly interpret another’s emotion (see
also Preston and de Waal, 2003). Especially when mimicry is
absent because of potential negative effects, the empathy felt by
the observer may be more crucial in correctly identifying others’
feelings.
THE PRESENT STUDY
In the present study we test hypotheses following from a Social
Contextual view on emotional mimicry. We evoke two emotions,
disgust and pride. We chose disgust because it is an emotion
that is easily evoked and previous studies on its neural under-
pinnings have shown that both seeing and experiencing disgust
activates similar areas in the brain, which would make mimicry
of the disgust expression maximally likely (Wicker et al., 2003).
Moreover, disgust has a very clear and specific set of facial move-
ments, namely the Nose Wrinkler (AU9), the Upper Lip Raiser
(AU10), and AU43 (closing the eyes). If observers mimic dis-
gust, there should be a significant correlation between these facial
movements of the observer and expresser. In addition to these
specific disgust expressions, we also examined the frown (AU4)
as a more general index of negative mood or a signal of worry,
and smiles (AU12), as an index of affiliation, appeasement, or
amusement.
We chose pride as a positive emotion, because pride is a dis-
crete emotion that has recently been shown to have unique facial
expressions (Tracy and Robins, 2004; Mortillaro et al., 2012). It
differs from happiness in that it clearly is not an emotion that
would be shared unconditionally with others, because pride is tri-
umph about one’s own achievements, and therefore need not elicit
pride in others, unless those others are intimates or friends. Pride
is therefore an interesting emotion to test the social functions of
smile mimicry.
In sum, our first prediction is that individuals do not mimic
disgust, because disgust is a non-affiliative signal, and the mim-
icry of disgust is therefore not socially functional. Second, we
predict that individuals mimic positive expressions (i.e., smiles)
both during the disgust event, as well as during the pride event,
but only when the relationship between expresser and observer
is affiliative (e.g., Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Lakin et al., 2003;
Stel et al., 2010). Third, we predict that observers’ empathy, and
not their facial mimicry, will mediate the relationship between
the expresser’s disgust and pride, and the recognition of these
emotions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
We recruited 278 persons during a Dutch summer festival (“Libelle
Zomerweek”). We first deleted six couples that included men,
because we expected gender differences in emotional expressive-
ness, and there were too few men to be able to compare the results
for men and women. In the original experiment we also had a con-
dition (N= 120) in which the expresser had to hide her emotions.
We do not report this condition in the present paper. This leaves
146 women. Because the quality of the videos on the first day was
bad (too dark), we had to leave out the data of 34 other women.
This leaves us with 112 women (M age= 45.31, SDage= 12.65;
96.4% Dutch), in 56 couples. Participants within each couple were
either intimates (friends or family, N= 60) or strangers (N= 52).
The assignment to either condition was however not completely
random. Those participants who were together with a familiar per-
son were coupled and assigned to the intimates condition, while
those participants who approached us as single visitors were ran-
domly coupled with another, unfamiliar, person, and assigned to
the strangers condition. In some occasions, we also asked two
couples of intimates to split up and rearrange as two couples
of strangers. Additionally, within each couple participants were
assigned to either be the expresser, or the receiver on the basis
of the chair they chose. They could not know which chair was
selected for the expresser and which for the observer. Participation
was entirely voluntary.
PROCEDURE
After having provided informed consent, participants were
instructed to enter a cubicle together with their partner (intimate
vs. stranger) and the experimenter. In the cubicle, the experimenter
asked the two participants to choose one of the two available
chairs. Depending on their choice of the chair, they were either the
expresser or the observer. Both were introduced to the experiment
and were told that in the next 5 min one of them had to complete
small and simple tasks, while the other person would just observe.
They then received a written instruction to “behave naturally dur-
ing the whole experiment”. Expressers were additionally asked to
“freely show their feelings and thoughts to their partner”, while
receivers were instructed to “simply focus their attention on their
partner.” The experimenter stressed that they were not allowed to
speak during the experiment, but that they should stay in (eye)
contact.
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To evoke disgust, the experimenter asked the expresser to eval-
uate the smell of two “brand new” cleaning agents. While one
of the non-transparent flasks was filled with conventional fabric
softener, the other flask was filled with a strong water solution of
asafetida, an Eastern spice with a pungent, unpleasant smell (also
known as “devil’s dung”). After listening to the product evaluation
cover story, expressers opened the first bottle, always containing
the conventional fabric softener, and smelled it. Then they closed
the first bottle, opened the second flask, containing asafetida, and
smelled it. Then the experimenter asked which one of the two they
preferred.
After this first event, two other emotions were evoked (sur-
prise, disappointment), which will not be reported in the present
paper. The last emotion that was elicited was pride. We had partic-
ipants look at a booklet containing four photos of crying babies.
We told them that one of these babies was a boy and they had
to figure out which one was the boy. In order to elicit pride, the
experimenter introduced the task by telling them that this was a
very difficult task and that many people made mistakes. They then
could look at the photos for however long they wanted. When
they gave their answer, the experimenter always said that this was
the correct answer and praised them for being very clever (inde-
pendent of which answer they gave). After the last part of the
experimental session, both participants left the cubicle and were
administered a questionnaire about the experiment.
MEASURES
We had two slightly different questionnaires for the expresser and
observer. First of all, the expressers were asked to report the inten-
sity of several emotions after the smelling of the second flask, and
after receiving the compliment, whereas the observers were asked
what they thought their partner felt during these events. Both the
expresser and the observer could rate the intensity of nine differ-
ent emotions, seven negative (irritation, disgust, sadness, surprise,
shame, sadness, and stress) and two positive (happiness and pride).
They were asked to indicate the intensity with which they had felt,
or thought their partner had felt, each of these emotions. For all
items an 8-point Likert scale was used, ranging from 0 (not at all)
to 7 (very strong ).
To measure the degree of empathy between the partners,
expressers and observers were asked to indicate the extent to which
they felt empathy with the other. For the observers, the items
were as follows: “I shared my partner’s emotions,” “I empathized
with my partner,” and “I saw that my partner felt the same emo-
tion as I did,” “I felt a strong bond with my partner,” Cronbach’s
alphaobservers= 0.71; Cronbach’s alphaexpressers= 0.80). In order
to check whether intimates and strangers indeed differed in the
nature of their relationship, we measured the amount of familiarity
persons felt for the other (“To what extent do you feel familiar with
the other person?”). At the end, we asked for their age, nationality,
and education. After having completed all self-report measures,
participants were debriefed and dismissed.
FACIAL EXPRESSIONS
In order to code the facial expressions of both the expresser and
the receiver during the task, we recorded each participant on
video camera throughout the experiment (using two cameras who
filmed the participants from a frontal perspective). We selected
the video fragments for the disgust expressions, starting with the
moment that the expressers started smelling at the second bottle
with the disgusting smell until they put it down. On average the
fragments were about 5 s long. The video fragments for the pride
event were selected immediately after the experimenter gave the
compliment to the expresser and before they started talking about
the expresser’s answer. These fragments took about 2 s on average.
The first author coded the intensity of the following action
units on the basis of Ekman’s Facial Action Coding System (1978).
For disgust: AU9 (Nose Wrinkler), AU10 (Upper Lip Raiser), AU43
(closing the eyes1), AU4 (Brow Lowerer, or frown), and AU12 (Lip
Corner Puller, or smile). AU9 and AU10 were coded as one expres-
sion, which we will refer to as AU9/10, because it was very hard
to see the distinction between the two facial movements, partly
because many of the women wore glasses (see also Hawk et al.,
2012, for a similar decision). For pride, one action unit was scored:
AU12 (smile). A score of 0 indicated that the action unit was not
present, a score of 3 indicated that the action unit was very strongly
visible.
In order to calculate inter reliability of the coding, a certified
FACS coder coded 61% of the participants (N = 68). Correlations
between the two coders were high and significant (all p’s< 0.0001,
for AU9.90; for AU4.91, for AU43.80, and for AU12.84).
RESULTS
CHECKS
We first examined whether the emotion of disgust and pride were
adequately evoked. With regard to disgust, a repeated measures
ANOVA with the expressers’ self-reported disgust, stress, irrita-
tion, and surprise right after smelling the disgusting smell (the
other emotions were almost always rated as “not at all”), showed a
significant effect, F(3, 53)= 115.738, p< 0.0001, η2p = 0.87. Dis-
gust was reported as much more intense (M = 5.00, SD= 2.12)
than was surprise (M = 0.80, SD= 2.00), irritation (M = 0.35,
SD= 1.25), or stress (M = 0.02, SD= 0.13). A Paired-Samples t -
test comparing disgust and the averaged scores on stress, irritation,
and surprise showed that disgust was reported as more intense
[t (55)= 14.31, p< 0.0001].
With respect to pride, a repeated measures ANOVA with the
expressers’ self-reported pride, happiness, disappointment, and
surprise felt after the compliment also showed a significant effect,
F(2, 54)= 57.10, p< 0.0001, η2p = 0.36. Pride was reported
as most intense (M = 3.78, SD= 2.61), followed by happiness
(M = 2.39, SD= 2.88), surprise (M = 1.11, SD= 2.20), and disap-
pointment (M = 0.02, SD= 0.13). A Paired-Samples t -test com-
paring pride and the averaged scores on happiness, disappoint-
ment, and surprise showed that pride was reported as more intense
[t (55)= 6.50, p< 0.0001]. Even the comparison with only hap-
piness, proved to be significant, [t (55)= 2.55, p= 0.014]. Thus,
although pride was felt as less intense than was disgust, the
elicitation of both emotions can be considered successful.
1 We also coded looking away as AU43, although this is not listed in the FACS man-
ual. However, because looking away in this context had the same effect as closing the
eyes, and almost always coincided with AU43, we found it appropriate to include
this movement.
Frontiers in Psychology | Emotion Science November 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 475 | 4
Fischer et al. Mimicry of disgust and pride
We then checked whether these feelings of disgust and pride
in the expresser were correlated with expresser’s facial move-
ments that are typically associated with these emotions. We found
significant positive correlations between expresser’s self-reported
feelings of disgust and looking away (AU43; r = 0.32, p= 0.018),
but not with nose wrinkling (AU9/10, r = 0.20, p= 0.15). We also
did not find a positive correlation between feelings of disgust and
frowning (AU4; r = 0.22, p= 0.11) The three Action Units were
positively correlated with each other: AU9/10 (nose wrinkling)
with AU4 (frowning, r = 0.62, p< 0.0001), and with AU43 (look-
ing away, r = 0.56, p< 0.0001), and AU 4 with AU43 (r = 0.56,
p< 0.0001). In the case of pride we did not find significant cor-
relations between the self-reported feeling of pride or happiness,
and smiling (all p’s> 0.40). The absence of significant correlations
between pride or happiness and smiling is not completely unex-
pected, because smiling has a variety of meanings (see also Nieden-
thal et al., 2010). We will discuss this further in the Discussion
section.
Finally, we checked whether participants in the intimate con-
dition felt more familiar with each other than the participants
in the stranger condition. This was indeed the case, show-
ing that friends (M = 6.25, SD= 0.96) felt more familiar than
strangers (M = 1.44, SD= 1.10; F(1, 104)= 571.19, p< 0.0001,
η2p = 0.85)2. In addition, friend observers (M = 5.44, SD= 0.97)
also felt more empathy with the other than stranger observers
(M = 4.78, SD= 1.00), F(1, 52)= 5.83 p= 0.019, η2p = 0.10.
EMOTIONAL MIMICRY IN REACTION TO DISGUST
In order to examine disgust mimicry, we computed correlations
between the negative facial displays of observers and expressers
(see Table 1). No significant correlations were found, confirm-
ing our prediction that observers did not mimic disgust. We then
split the file for intimates and strangers, and used the composite
score of AU9, AU43, and AU4, in order to have more observations
per cell. No significant correlation was found, either for inti-
mates (r =−0.04, p= 0.85), or for strangers (r = 0.16, p= 0.43).
As expected, however, correlations of expressers’ and observers’
smiles during the disgust event were significant in the intimate
2 Seven participants forgot to fill in this part of the questionnaire.
Table 1 | Correlations between facial actions of expresser and
observer after the disgust stimulus.
Observer AU9/10
(nose
wrinkling)
AU 43
(closing eyes)
+ looking away
AU4
(frowning)
AU12
(smiling)
EXPRESSER
AU9/10 0.04 0.18 0.12 0.23#
AU43
(+ looking away )
0.03 −0.02 0.13 0.03
AU4 −0.05 0.02 −0.12 0.05
AU12 −0.02 0.06 0.08 0.19
Note. #p=0.08.
condition (r = 0.47, p= 0.009), but not in the stranger condition
(r =−0.05, p= 0.82).
We then examined the amount of disgust expressiveness as
a function of expressers versus observers and intimates ver-
sus strangers. We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with
nature of relation (intimates, strangers) as between-subjects fac-
tor, expresser and observer as within-subject factor, and the scores
of AU9, AU43, and AU4 as dependent variables. A main effect
of expresser-observer was found, F(3, 52)= 10.83, p< 0.0001,
η2p = 0.38, showing that expressers displayed a greater intensity of
all facial expressions (see Table 2), but no main effect, nor inter-
action with the nature of the relationship was found. In other
words, intimates did not express more disgust than strangers, but
observers clearly showed less disgust than expressers. We also con-
ducted a repeated measures ANOVA with smiling as dependent
measure, and nature of relation as between-subjects factor, and
again found no effect of the nature of the relation, and no differ-
ence between the intensity of smiling of expressers and observers
(see Table 2 for the statistics).
The absence of disgust mimicry, as defined by non-significant
correlations between expressers’ and observers’ facial disgust dis-
plays, may also be explained by a lack of empathy. However, the
correlation between two of the three facial displays by the expresser
and empathic feelings of the observer were significant: frowning
(r = 31, p= 0.024), and looking away (r = 0.30, p= 0.027). Thus,
the more the expresser looked away or frowned, the stronger the
empathy evoked in the observer.
EMOTIONAL MIMICRY IN REACTION TO PRIDE
In order to examine pride mimicry, we computed correlations
between the smiles of observers and expressers. Across conditions,
no significant correlations were found, but when computing sepa-
rate correlations for intimates and strangers, we found a significant
correlation for smiling for intimates (r = 0.59, p= 0.001), and not
for strangers (r = 0.07, p= 0.73).
We then conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with nature of
relation (intimates, strangers) as between-subjects factor, expresser
and observer as within-subject factor, with the intensity of smiles
(AU12) as dependent variable. We found a significant univariate
effect of expresser-observer, F(1, 54)= 4.37, p= 0.041,η2p = 0.07,
for smiling, and no effect of the nature of the relation. Expressers
Table 2 | Means (SD) for facial movements after the disgust stimulus,
as displayed by expressers and observers.
Expresser Observer F (1, 54) p< η2
p
AU43 (closing
eyes)+ looking
away
1.05 (1.18) 0.16 (0.46) 26.63 0.0001 0.33
AU9/10 (nose
wrinkling)
1.36 (1.15) 0.59 (0.89) 15.96 0.0001 0.23
AU4 (frowning) 1.46 (1.19) 0.64 (0.84) 15.36 0.0001 0.22
AU12 (smiling) 1.36 (1.07) 1.63 (1.04) 2.33 0.13 0.04
Note. Facial actions are coded on a scale ranging from 0 (not visible) to 3 (strongly
visible).
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(M = 1.88, SD= 0.69) smiled more than observers (M = 1.50,
SD= 1.32).
RECOGNITION OF DISGUST
We first examined whether observers accurately recognized the
expresser’s facial display as disgust. Twenty-one percent (N= 12)
of the observers did not recognize the expression as disgust, but
as another emotion. Repeated measures ANOVA with perceived
intensity of disgust, stress, irritation, and surprise (the other
emotions were not observed, and therefore are not included in
the analysis) and nature of relation showed a significant effect of
emotion, F(3, 52)= 73.41, p< 0.0001, η2p = 0.81. Disgust was
perceived as more intense (M = 4.07, SD= 2.62) than was sur-
prise (M = 1.11, SD= 1.92), irritation (M = 0.42, SD= 1.22), or
stress (M = 0.05, SD= 0.29). No effect of nature of the relation,
F(3, 52)= 0.69, p= 0.69, was found.
To test whether the relation between the expression and recog-
nition of disgust was mediated by mimicry, we conducted a series
of regression analyses following Baron and Kenny (1986). The first
regression showed that disgust expression significantly predicted
disgust recognition, b= 0.30, SE= 0.11; [t (54)= 2.77, p= 0.008].
Second, disgust expression did not significantly predict our pro-
posed mediator, b= 0.03, SE= 0.07; [t (54)= 42, p= 0.68], and
the mediator also did not predict the recognition of disgust
b=−0.09, SE= 0.22; [t (54)=−0.40, p= 0.69], thus no support
for mediation by mimicry was found.
We then conducted similar regression analyses with empa-
thy as mediator. First, we found a significant relation between
disgust expression and empathy as reported by the observer,
b= 0.12, SE= 0.04; [t (54)= 2.60, p= 0.21]; second, empathy sig-
nificantly predicted the recognition of disgust, b= 0.98, SE= 0.33;
[t (54)= 2.99, p= 0.004]. When we added empathy to disgust
expression as a predictor of recognition, empathy remained a sig-
nificant predictor, b= 0.74, SE= 0.34; [t (54)= 2.18, p= 0.034],
but the relation between disgust expression and recognition
also remained significant (b= 0.24, SE=−0.11; [t (54)= 2.11,
p= 0.04]. A Sobel test showed that the indirect path was sig-
nificant, S= 1.97 (SE= 0.057, p= 0.049), showing that disgust
recognition was partly mediated by empathy.
We further explored whether the relationship may also be
reversed, such that the empathy that is evoked by an emotion
expression is mediated by emotion recognition. Additional analy-
ses testing this model showed that recognition of disgust signifi-
cantly predicted empathy by the observer, b= 0.151, SE= 0.051;
[t (54)= 2.98, p= 0.004], however, when adding emotion recog-
nition to the equation, disgust expression disappeared as a sig-
nificant predictor of empathy: b= 0.08, SE= 0.046; [t (54)= 1.66,
p= 0.10]. In other words, disgust recognition fully mediated the
relation between expression and empathy.
RECOGNITION OF PRIDE AND HAPPINESS
We examined whether observers accurately interpreted the
expresser’s facial display as pride. Sixty-six percent (N= 38) of
the observers did not recognize the facial expression as pride;
32% (N= 19) did not even recognize it as happiness. Repeated
measures ANOVA with the perceived intensity of pride, happi-
ness, and surprise and nature of the relation as between-subjects
factor showed a significant effect of the emotion, F(2, 54)= 13.04,
p< 0.0001, η2p = 0.33. The most intensely perceived emotion was
happiness (M = 2.98, SD= 2.62), followed by pride (M = 1.59,
SD= 3.00) and surprise (M = 0.61, SD= 2.07). Nature of the rela-
tionship was not significant, F(2, 54)= 0.54, p= 0.40. We then
tested whether smiling predicted the recognition of happiness (we
did not include pride as dependent measure, because pride was not
recognized by 66% of the participants). The regression analysis was
not significant for happiness, b= 0.42, SE= 0.59; [t (54)= 0.40,
p= 0.49]. We further examined whether empathy was a signifi-
cant predictor of happiness, and found that it was not, b=−0.30,
SE= 0.41; [t (54)=−0.72, p= 0.48], but the interaction between
empathy and nature of the relationship was marginally significant,
b= 0.33, SE= 0.17; [t (54)= 1.93, p= 0.059], suggesting that in
the intimate condition more empathy resulted in the perception
of marginally more intense happiness.
DISCUSSION
The present study examined mimicry of disgust and pride, which
were chosen because they are discrete emotions, but different from
the most frequently studied emotions, namely anger and happi-
ness. We used an interactive setting because the social implications
of mimicry can best be studied in an actual social interaction. We
successfully evoked disgust by having one participant smell a vile
odor from a bottle, and pride by giving the participant a com-
pliment after a seemingly difficult task. In both cases, another
participant (either an intimate or a stranger) was watching and
the faces of both persons were videotaped with two cameras. We
assumed that both disgust and pride can signal negative social
intentions, which would lead participants to refrain from mimicry.
A disgust face can be easily interpreted as offensive (see Chapman
et al., 2009) and the expression of pride can signal social distance
(Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Fischer and Manstead, 2008).
We found support for the hypotheses that the facial display
of disgust was not mimicked, whereas smiles – evoked after the
disgust and the pride stimuli – were mimicked, but only among
intimates. This is in line with a Social Contextual view on emo-
tional mimicry (see Hess and Fischer, in revision), which states
that facial displays of emotions are only mimicked if they serve an
affiliation function. The mimicry of emotion should signal empa-
thy or understanding and thereby foster social bonds and should
be inhibited when its social consequences can be potentially neg-
ative. An affiliation context is determined by both the nature of
the emotional signal and the relationship between expresser and
observer. The mimicry of negative “attack” emotions (see Rose-
man et al., 1994) or socially distancing emotions (Markus and
Kitayama, 1991) is therefore not likely in most interactive con-
texts, because it is less probable that these are seen as signals of
support or understanding. Looking at a disgust face is somewhat
threatening or at least unpleasant, even if you know that the other
person is not disgusted by you.
Still, previous research has found mimicry of negative emo-
tions, which requires an explanation. We believe that this is due
to the fact that mimicry has been defined and operationalized in
different ways. In the current study we operationalized mimicry as
a significant correlation between facial expressions of expresser
and observer within a fixed time frame, indicating that facial
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movements of expressers and observers occurred simultaneously
within this time frame (see also Hess and Bourgeois, 2010). In
research using photos or video’s, however, the mere occurrence of
a congruent facial response (i.e., frowning in response to an angry
face) has been operationalized as mimicry. Whereas we found
no significant correlations, observers did show facial actions in
reaction to the disgust face of the other participant. For exam-
ple, although observers hardly closed their eyes or looked away
(AU43) – which makes sense considering that this would be the
immediate reaction to the vile smell that they however never
directly experienced – they did sometimes frown or wrinkle their
nose. In our view however, correlations between facial movements
are a more adequate operationalization of mimicry, although we
acknowledge that the observer’s less intense facial actions related
to disgust can at least be seen as assimilative emotion displays (see
also Tiedens and Fragale, 2003).
The fact that observers showed less intense emotion displays
can be the result of different processes, and the present data are
not conclusive in this respect. First of all, it can simply be the result
of the fact that the emotional stimulus for the observer, i.e., the
other person’s face, was less intense than the emotional stimulus
that evoked the disgust in the expresser, namely the vile smell in the
bottle. Second, it may also point to an inhibition of the mimicry
reaction, which is overriden by the motivation to show concern
and empathy. The observers’ facial reaction to the expressers’ dis-
gust would then still reflect empathy, even though it did not meet
our strict criteria of mimicry. This idea is supported by the pos-
itive correlations between the expresser’s display of disgust and
self-reported empathic feelings on the part of the observer, but
also by the mimicry of smiling after the disgust stimulus.
The finding that smiling was mimicked only in the intimate
condition further supports a Social Contextual view of mimicry
and is in line with previous studies (Hess and Bourgeois, 2010;
Stel et al., 2010). Our participants’ mimicry of smiling clearly
served an affiliation function, because they only showed smile
mimicry when they were familiar with each other. These smiles
therefore may reflect an empathic response in a situation where
a negative emotion was evoked. These joint smiles can emphasize
shared bonding, but also awkwardness or amusement about what
was happening during this event. In a situation where negative
emotions are elicited, observers may seek positive facial signals
in order to mimic their feelings of empathy. It should be noted,
however, that the fact that strangers did not show smile mimicry
does not mean that strangers did not smile, as can be observed
from the means. It merely indicates that they did not respond to
each other’s smiles. This absence of smile mimicry in our view
indicates the absence of an affiliation motive, which may be due
to the fact that the context was non-affiliative (display of disgust),
and the relationship was not affiliative. There may be situations
where individuals still may have a motive to affiliate with the other
person, however, we suggest that this is mostly the case when they
share a common goal or when the situation requires affiliation.
This was not the case in the present situation.
As predicted, the mimicry of smiles in reaction to the pride
stimulus was also only found in the intimate condition. We argued
that pride would be more easily shared with intimates than with
strangers, which is supported by the fact that intimates, and not
strangers, mimic each other’s smiles. It should be noted that pride
(and happiness) were not reported as very intense. In addition,
these feelings were not significantly correlated with the intensity
of the smiles. Various studies have shown that pride has a unique
expression and can be differentiated from other positive emotions
(e.g., Tracy and Robins, 2004; Hawk et al., 2009; Mortillaro et al.,
2012), but these studies have mostly used prototypical expres-
sions, and predominantly bodily expressions, whereas we used
spontaneous pride expressions. In real life – and in the current
experiment – pride is often mixed with happiness, or surprise, and
thus the expression of such a blend emotion may have been less
easy to recognize. In addition, smiles have many meanings (see also
LaFrance et al., 2003; Niedenthal et al., 2010), and therefore corre-
lations with specific mental states may be hard to find. Finally, the
reported feelings of pride were not very intense, and thus would
not always result in a prototypical expression. In some cases, the
participants did not seem proud at all, because they found it obvi-
ous to have given the correct answer to the question which of the
crying babies was a boy.
This all means that the compliment may have been a more
ambiguous stimulus than the repulsive smell, and this may explain
why no significant determinants of pride recognition have been
found. The ambiguity of the situation may also provide an alterna-
tive explanation of why smile mimicry only occurs in the intimate
condition. Intimates seek support and may wish to strengthen
their relationship more than strangers, especially in ambiguous
situations. Uncertainty evokes the need for safety and bonding,
and participants would then rely more on people they like (see
e.g., Likowski et al., 2008; Stel et al., 2010), or who were supportive
or rewarding in the past (see also Sims et al., 2012).
The empathy that was evoked by the expression of disgust
also played a prominent role in the recognition of disgust, and
to a lesser extent in the recognition of happiness (pride was
recognized so badly that we did not further test factors influ-
encing pride recognition). We examined whether mimicry and
or empathy would improve the correct recognition of emotions.
We found no support for this mimicry function. Instead, the
more women expressed disgust, the better observers recognized
disgust, and this was partially mediated by the reported empa-
thy observers felt with the other person. In other words, the
empathy felt for the other person helped observers to perceive
higher levels of disgust. In addition, perceiving disgust in turn also
increased empathy with the other. Empathy therefore seems to be
a facilitating mental state as well as an implication of emotion
recognition.
The finding that mimicry did not help to accurately recog-
nize emotions is not inconsistent with previous studies. In studies
where mimicry effects on recognition have been found, these were
mostly found when mimicry was manipulated, when speed of
recognition was measured, or when subtle emotion stimuli were
used (e.g., Stel and Vonk, 2010; Hawk et al., 2012). In the present
research, mimicry was spontaneous, and was only found for pos-
itive emotion displays and thus it is not surprising that it did not
influence disgust recognition. The fact that mimicry also did not
influence pride/happiness recognition may be explained by the
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fact that the pride expression did not result in pride recognition.
Mimicry can only play a role when the emotion is clearly expressed
and interpreted.
This study has limitations, which simultaneously emphasize its
strengths. The fact that data were collected in a natural setting
enhances the ecological validity of the study. We had participants
with a variety of backgrounds, who were all very motivated to
take part in the experiment. Moreover, an interactive setting as
used in the current study, where two individuals see each other
and react to each other, is most adequate to study social functions
of emotion mimicry. In actual social interactions, social regula-
tion processes are prompted and observers may adjust their facial
reactions more or less automatically when they expect negative
social consequences (see e.g., Manstead and Fischer, 2001; Evers
et al., 2005). Studies of mimicry in more natural social interactions
are scarce, and we think that this makes the contribution of this
study valuable.
We should also acknowledge, however, that the experimental
environment was not always as standardized as we would have
liked. There was noise that could have distracted, and partici-
pants were not alone when completing the questionnaires. Having
acknowledged these limitations, however, we think that the present
results show that we do not automatically mimic negative emo-
tions, but rather seek out the positive signals that are only mim-
icked when the context is affiliative. We believe that this study
can potentially open up a new avenue of research on emotional
mimicry in which its social implications, and thus boundary
conditions, are taken into account.
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